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European subsidies from an economic point 
of view1 
Krassen Stanchev 
 
I should start off by saying that as I write this, 
Bulgaria is not the country I have in mind. 
Bulgaria is a separate case. Of course, anyone 
can use what I am about to say to draw 
conclusions about this separate case. I will talk 
specifically about those subsidy effects, which 
are difficult to see or, if seen, are left 
unaccounted for (or at least inadequately 
accounted for). 
In order to understand these peculiarities, one 
has to compare the European funds to pure aid, 
which supposedly does not exist in the EU, but 
technically all transfers from the EU budget to 
the member states (and to the candidate 
countries) are just that, to a varying degree. In 
drawing comparisons, I will use the work of 
several world-renowned economists and a 
historian. The views of the scholars in question 
are rather well-known and in this format I would 
not discuss them in any detail. These scholars 
are Milton Friedman, Peter Bauer, Mansur 
Olson, Simeon Djankov and some of his 
colleagues at the World Bank2, and the historian 
                                                 
1 The article is first published in Dnevnik in IME’s 
column “What is Seen and What is not Seen”.  
2 This work deserves a special mentioning: Simeon 
Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo and Larta Reynal-Querol, 
Does Foreign Aid Help?, Cato Journal, vol. 26, No 1 
(Winter 2006), pp. 1-28.  It compares foreign aid to 
other forms of international transfers (foreign direct 
investment, remittances and loans) in terms of impact 
Tony Judt. Their analysis can easily be found on 
the web, in libraries or in bookstores, and their 
inferences can be compared to the ones in this 
article.  
Ordinary logic 
The main shortcoming of the EU’s redistributive 
mechanism, particular countries, and the 
international transfer of resources, termed “aid” 
(excluding the standard emergency solidarity 
offered after natural disasters) is, first and 
foremost, the disregard for and even attempted 
refutation of ordinary human logic or common 
sense. Here are three ordinary occurrences that 
illustrate my point. 
First, imagine that I spend my personal means 
on myself. Unless my means are unlimited, then 
it is very likely that I carefully monitor how 
much, in what way, and on what I spend my 
money. 
Second, imagine that you spend my means and I 
spend yours. That, which would concern us most 
is how much we spend. Since that is easily 
understood, we would probably have to agree on 
what and how we spend this money, as well as 
how we are to inform one another about our 
actions. 
Third, imagine that I spend your money on 
someone else. Of course, it is possible that you 
are doing the same. That is beside the point. The 
                                                                         
on economic growth and democratic impacts. 
My original idea was to review the intra-EU financial 
transfers with the same set of criteria, but collecting 
needed information requires considerable time and 
effort.  This explains why I deal with only general of 
economic argument.   
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important thing is that in this situation everyone, 
except for the original owner of the means, 
would be less interested in how and on what the 
money is spent than he was in the first two 
scenarios. It is also probable that everyone 
(except for the owner) would be interested in 
spending more. Reaching a mutual agreement 
would be much more complicated, unpredictable 
and costly. 
Expressed a few years ago in a conversation 
with president Bush, the original idea of 
describing the process of redistribution in such a 
way belongs to the Nobel laureate Friedman. 
Which of the above-described situations does the 
distribution of EU subsidies most closely 
resemble? 
You are right – the third. It only somewhat 
resembles the second and does not even 
approach the first. 
 
The source of ineffectiveness 
The next question, which we should probably 
ask, ourselves is: in what way does the process 
of European subsidization differ from the second 
and third scenarios described above? 
Naturally, what comes to mind first is that this 
process is quite complicated. 
On the one hand, the governments of the 
candidate and member countries alike spend the 
money of their taxpayers. With respect to the 
constituents in these countries, the governments 
are in the situation of the person who spends 
another’s money on a third person. It makes no 
difference whether this third person is in the 
“Third World”, in Eastern Europe, in Ireland, 
Malta, Lithuania, Greece or even at home. If one 
digs in the information on EU transfers to 
Ireland, on one hand, and Greece or Portugal – 
on the other and compares the transfers with the 
economic growth rates, it become obvious that 
there is no correlation. 
At first glance, it seems simple to understand, 
but actually, it is rather complicated to control 
the logic of collective action of this kind of 
money transfer. 
At the root of this logic lies the fact described by 
Mansur Olson, that a small group of people can 
be organized more easily than a big one. When 
heavy financing is carried out in the name of 
taxpayers, the resources themselves and the cost 
of acquiring them affect a large group of people. 
When we think about how small the amount is 
per person, it becomes clear that he or she has no 
incentive to inquire about the amount of money, 
where it goes and how it is spent, regardless of 
whether there is accountancy at hand or not. 
This is how the phenomenon of informed 
ignorance spreads: people know that something 
is wrong, inexpedient or even foolish, but 
making an effort to chance the situation is so 
complicated that they do not bother. 
This phenomenon has both ethical dimensions 
and economic alterations: those who use 
another’s money organize relatively easily in 
order to take more. Naturally, this awakens the 
resentment of those, whose resources are being 
taken away, even if they are in small amounts.  
But yet, let me take a few moments to talk about 
the informational awareness of ignorance. 
On average, the government redistribution in the 
EU is above 40% of GDP while transfers to 
Brussels are fixed at around 1% of GDP. Other 
thing equal, the reasons to worry about EU 
transfers are 40 times less important than own 
government redistribution.  
When the organization of a lot of people is easy 
after all – for example during elections and 
referendums, the mood that someone seeks more 
rents and that the rent “we” get is less than that 
of the “others” always manifests itself somehow. 
It seems to me that this phenomenon more 
accurately explains particular political 
circumstances. For example, the voting at last 
year’s referendums in the Netherlands and 
France on the so called Draft EU Constitution 
Treaty is the product of an accumulation of 
similar moods, not of outright egoism, 
nationalism, left or right populism.  
On the other hand, effectiveness in general can 
be defined as the use of someone’s resources for 
the attainment of a certain desired goal with the 
lowest possible cost or the achievement of the 
best possible outcome with the resources at 
hand. 
The European subsidies are closest to the course 
of the third scenario for the use of money 
described above. 
The resources are someone else’s. They are 
spent on someone, who does not correspond to 
the person who provides them. The methods for 
tracing their exhaustion are complicated and 
costly, while ameliorating the situation seems 
impossible.  
On top of that, other details are also present. 
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Unlike direct investment from private companies 
and individuals, the resources must be gathered 
entirely from taxpayers, a decision must be made 
regarding their allocation, a tender competition 
has to be organized and a bidder chosen to carry 
out the job. After all of this, someone has to 
monitor the company’s spending.  
It is not difficult to see, that the means, which 
are subject to transfer to favored countries are 35 
to 50 times less than those that the sender’s 
government spends and redistributes at home 
(depending on the range of government 
expenditures to GDP).  
In the favored country, a candidate or member of 
the EU, these resources are 10 to 25 times less 
than those, which the local government 
redistributes from their taxpayers’ means 
(depending on the range of EU transfers to 
GDP).  
Hence on both sides of the process, the interest 
in what the government does with taxpayers’ 
resources has a very high opportunity cost: with 
equal effort (i.e. resources), the results at home 
would be much better.  
Finally, as my colleague Kevin Allen 
commented in the December 2005 issue of this 
bulletin3, the European Court of Auditors refuses 
to sign the financial report for the 12th year in a 
row because of “significant omissions and 
inaccuracies.” The Commission’s excuse is that 
the omissions happen at the candidate-country 
level.  
In short, the ineffectiveness of European 
subsidies stems from the fact that someone 
else’s money is being spent on a third person. 
 
Brussels’s subsidies for the member states 
and “aid” for the “Third World” 
Is there a difference between them? I think so, 
but it is insubstantial.  
As Peter Bauer says, “Calling official transfers 
of wealth “aid” confirms an unquestionable 
attitude. It disarms all criticism, blurs reality and 
carries through a preliminary evaluation of sorts. 
Who could be opposed to help offered to the less 
successful? The term itself allows the supporters 
of aid to vie for a monopoly on compassion and 
                                                 
3 Kevin P. Allen, Inaction In Action: The Court of 
Auditors, European Commissioners, and the Problem 
of Financial Mismanagement, at: http://www.ime-
bg.org/pr_en/index.html 
to blame the critics for their lack of involvement 
and empathy.”  
That which the term “aid” results in, regarding 
the transfer of resources to countries of the 
“Third World” in the context of Brussels’s 
subsidies, can be attained with the term 
“solidarity.”  
Even renowned historians like Tony Judt find 
this principle to be an “actual achievement” for 
the EU. According to them, it has replaced the 
use of taxes for arms, overcome the Marxist 
notion of economic predetermination, and 
ensured the primacy of politics over economics, 
which is unique in the case of the EU. From an 
economic point of view this explanation only 
serves as justification for the ineffectiveness of 
subsidies and does not necessarily means that 
mechanism for reduction of political risks is 
established once and forever. It would logical to 
expect that it backfires at some point. The 
question to find an answer to is “when”. 
Apart from the similar justification, the 
similarities and insignificant differences between 
Brussels’s subsidies and “Third World” aid are 
the following: 
International transfers of wealth are the matter at 
hand in both cases, 
With subsidies, we see more elements of 
competition for Brussels’s public procurement, 
but such elements of competition, as well as 
demands for co-financing (as it is in the context 
of EU budget transfers) more and more 
frequently find their way into “Third World” aid,  
Incentives for informal coalescence in the 
exhaustion of the means exist, are created and 
supported in both cases,  
Transaction costs make both types of transfer 
more ineffective than the transfer of means from 
private entities to other private entities, whether 
individuals, families or companies, 
In both cases, government consumption 
increases and the temptation of corruption 
springs up,  
A significant difference is that Brussels’s 
subsidies have never been a cause of war, unlike 
several cases in Africa where fighting has 
broken out over aid disputes. In Europe, 
conflicts are political and are quelled by 
transfers of influence, the hiring of staff, and 
concessions regarding public spending. It is very 
likely that competition for influence, protection 
and rewards from the “Brussels’” budget is one 
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of the factors of growing regulatory deadweight 
and underutilization of economic potential. 
 
The effects of subsidies and aid (analogies) 
The above said gives me reason enough to draw 
some analogies between redistribution within the 
EU and the empirically studied impact of aid to 
the “Third World”. 
As mentioned, the most detailed of these studies 
was conducted by Simeon Djankov, José 
Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol, with 
results published last year and at the beginning 
of this year. In summary, the study comes to the 
following conclusions: 
Contrary to expectations, aid does not necessary 
affect domestic growth positively. It often harms 
the allocation of resources to the most profitable 
initiatives and mobilizes administrative and 
budget resources, which would have better 
alternative use or is lost due to administrative or 
auditing ineffectiveness. Reports of the 
European Court of Auditors unequivocally prove 
that this ineffectiveness occurs with European 
redistribution as well. On theoretical (but not 
empirical) grounds, one can presume that on 
account of transfer costs and ineffectiveness the 
abstractly possible positive impact of EU 
subsidies is highly doubtful. 
When it comes to aid, the increase in 
government consumption, spending, and 
opaqueness deters foreign investment and has a 
larger number of negative consequences than 
loans or foreign debt. In the case of Brussels’s 
subsidies, these investments are hardly hindered, 
but a limiting effect is probable – due to the 
temporizing of a sponsored resource, lobbying 
costs, etc.  
Aid undermines the nascent democracy in the 
“Third World” by augmenting the clientelism, 
opaqueness, and voters’ despair in the region. 
Ultimately, “payment on account of the need for 
political stability” yields the opposite result. The 
main reason lies in the creation of incentives for 
“privatization” of aid and the structures, which 
redistribute it following the logic described by 
Olsen. As far as European subsidies are 
concerned, various symptoms indicate that 
something similar is happening. But the size, as 
was mentioned earlier, is relatively small and the 
effects are thus less visible. Nonetheless, the 
referendums in the Netherlands and France 
brought about instability unknown 10 years ago 
and motivated a search for undemocratic ways 
out from the situation.  
Finally Djankov and his colleagues come to the 
conclusion that it is difficult to make aid 
effective, that conditional grants do not work, 
because there is no mechanism in place for the 
punishment of bad, inadequate or even harmful 
use of resources.  
According to economic theory, this is almost 
certainly the case with European subsidies, too. 
Until now, no one has empirically examined the 
process in an objective manner. In order to do 
so, someone may ask for a subsidy from 
Brussels.  
 
GDP in First Quarter of 2006 
Dimitar Chobanov 
 
Preliminary data for the gross domestic product 
(GDP) in the first quarter of 2006 have been 
recently released. The real GDP growth rate for 
the period has been 5.6 per cent while the real 
gross value added (GVA) has increased by 6.4 
per cent. Thus the trend for annual economic 
growth close to 5% that started since the first 
quarter of 2004 continues. 
The key factors for this positive development are 
the following. One of most important is the 
established and well-functioning currency board. 
It determines the relative stability of the 
Bulgarian Lev from an internal (in terms of 
goods’ and services’ prices in the local 
economy) and external aspect (in terms of other 
currencies). The ability of planning revenues and 
expenditures at firm level is increased as the 
total uncertainty in the economy is reduced, thus 
leading to better business environment. 
The next factor contributing to the maintenance 
of sustainable economic growth is free trade. It 
is well known that free exchange is a result of 
the mutual interest of two (or more) sides 
participating in it. Hence the value each 
participant places on the thing he or she receives 
is higher than the value of whatever he or she 
gives in exchange. Therefore both sides win and 
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are better off when they are allowed to trade 
freely. 
This is valid for exchange on the internal as well 
as the external market. The process of removing 
the obstacles to trade (reducing custom duties 
and other restrictions) related to the European 
Union integration of Bulgaria and market 
liberalization in the country have led to greater 
freedom for individuals, easier access to deeper 
markets, expanding opportunities to choose 
where to buy or sell specific good or service. 
Directly linked to the EU accession and the 
normal functioning of the currency board is 
capital liberalization. It provides investors with 
the chance to allocate their capitals efficiently, to 
diversify their portfolios according to their 
willingness to take risks and, ultimately, to 
generate a profit from their investment. 
While there has been an improvement in these 
factors in the last years, the conditions are not so 
great in terms of property rights protection and 
rule of law. Although some measures have been 
taken, reforms are protracted and the judicial 
system is not effective, which is a significant 
obstacle to acceleration of growth rates. An 
incentive for the local as well as the foreign 
investors is to receive and use the fruits of their 
efforts, which is not sufficiently guaranteed by 
the valid legislation and government institutions 
having to enforce it. 
The next factor suppressing faster development 
in the country is the high level of taxation. 
Amendments in tax laws during the last years 
have resulted in change in the structure of 
revenues in a consolidated budget; the share of 
direct taxes has declined on the account of 
indirect ones. But redistribution of the generated 
income in the economy through the budget has 
even increased to a level of around 43%, 
meaning that the government takes large portion 
of individuals’ incomes in one way or another. 
Creating incentives for labor and 
entrepreneurship by letting persons decide how 
to use their money is the way to achieve faster 
economic growth. 
Moreover, the tendency since 2004 is for 
keeping a large budget surplus, which means 
that more money is taken from the taxpayers 
than is needed to finance the excessive 
consolidated government expenditures that are 
ineffective. This money (of course, not the 
whole amount) could be used for investment, 
which would, in turn, contribute to the 
acceleration of income growth. This alternative 
is missed when posing the argument that a 
current account deficit should be offset by 
government saving. 
What are the effects of those factors? The 
positive development of GVA is due to industry 
(real growth rate of 8.8 per cent) and services (6 
per cent), while agriculture has contracted by 2.7 
per cent. Basically, the share of agriculture has 
declined on account of the other sectors, but the 
seasonal character of agriculture should be taken 
into consideration. Still, in the next quarters a 
positive growth could be expected in this sector 
keeping in mind the low base from 2005 caused 
by the floods. 
Concerning the issue about the engine of 
economic growth in Bulgaria, it is clearly the 
private sector. The GVA in it has increased by 
8.8 per cent while in the public sector it has 
fallen by 4.2 per cent. This result for the public 
sector is indicative, and the negative 
development during the period could not be 
attributed to privatization because it has been 
virtually stopped. So, the efficiency of this 
sector continues to be low considering ever 
growing costs. 
Final consumption has realized a real growth 
rate of 4.8 per cent because of growth in 
individual consumption by 5.4 per as well of 
collective consumption by 0.1 per cent. 
Implementing policies aimed at limiting the 
increase of collective consumption consisting of 
state administration, defense, scientific research 
and maintenance cost for the settlements is 
positive because of low (or zero) effectiveness 
and lack of reforms thus reducing the chance for 
any improvement. 
The share of consumption in GDP calculated on 
annul basis has reached 88.9 per cent, which is 
the highest value for this indicator according to 
available data. Following that, as well as lower 
net transfers and income from abroad, gross 
saving has decreased in nominal and real terms. 
Its amount on an annual basis is around EUR 3.5 
billion and its share in GDP is 15.9 per cent 
while the value of same indicators for the first 
quarter of 2005 is EUR 3.67 billion and 18.4 per 
cent of GDP respectively. It could be attributed 
to growing propensity of Bulgarians to present 
rather than future consumption because of easier 
access to credit. 
Investment measured by gross fixed capital 
formation has grown by 21.4 per cent in real 
terms, thus keeping the tendency for accelerating 
this rate in the last two years. The share of 
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investment has reached 24.5 per cent of GDP on 
an annual basis that is the highest value of this 
indicator, and it is a prerequisite for future real 
income growth. As domestic saving has 
decreased, a larger share of investment is 
financed from abroad. The ratio between 
domestic saving and gross fixed capital 
formation on annual basis has continued to fall, 
reaching 65.1 per cent while it was 91.1 per cent 
in the last quarter of 2004. 
As a result of growing import of saving, the 
current account deficit has widened. Import 
growth has exceeded that of exports in nominal 
and real terms. Along with this, the ratio 
between those components and GDP has also 
grown as well as the openness of the economy*. 
GDP data show positive economic development 
but the crucial fact is that the government’s 
policy does not support it. The lack or 
protraction of reforms lead to keeping growth 
rates close to current values but not to their 
acceleration. However, such delays mean missed 
opportunities in the future in terms of lower 
incomes and welfare. Apart from this, reforms 
would be beneficial for the government itself 
because of the EU requirements that have not 
been fulfilled yet. Expanding the economic 
liberty, lower taxes and well functioning judicial 
system should be the key aspects of 
government’s policies. 
 
------------ 
* This indicator is calculated as a ratio between the 
sum of export and import to GDP. 
 
 
 
 
The Magic Formula for Wages 
Adriana Mladenova 
 
Social policy minister Mrs. Maslarova is 
obviously determined to oppose market logic 
despite appeals from both the IMF and EU for 
the liberalization of wages and the abolishment 
of minimal seniority bonuses in Bulgaria. Last 
month, she proposed a new formula, which aims 
s to link the nominal growth rate of the salaries 
to certain indicators. This formula would be a 
compromise solution after the abolishment of the 
compulsory seniority bonuses and was proposed 
before the National Council of Three-party 
Cooperation. 
The formula states the following: the basic 
salary accounts for about 70% to 80% of the 
remuneration, compensation for hard conditions 
of labor - between 5% and 20%, and up to 10% 
of the wage comes from seniority and 
experience bonuses. 
The negative effects of the formalization of the 
wages have two-sided. On the one hand, the 
majority of voters are discontented with the 
proposition, because they believe that the 
indicators are not reasonable and fair enough 
and do not match their subjective notions about 
the price of their labor. On the other hand, such a 
reform will have a negative effect on the 
business environment although it will not be 
mandatory, only recommended for the private 
sector. The establishment of rules for the 
formation of labor costs contradicts the ideas of 
market economy and established practices even 
in the European Union, where the labor market 
is characterized by its over-regulation in 
comparison to the USA. Such a formula does not 
encourage workers and employers to negotiate 
the optimal rate of remuneration rather than 
relying on government rules. The wage rate 
should depend on the nature of the work, the 
abilities and characteristics of the employees. 
The proposed parameters of the formula are not 
fair to many people because they perceive 
themselves as “doomed” to get paid according to 
the ideas of the government, which may not 
necessarily match their own ideas. But the fact, 
itself, that there is such a formula leads to a 
culture of dependency and makes employees 
willing to ask the government to protect them 
against the unjust rate of wages. 
 
Economic justification of the proposition 
When a mechanism for government intervention 
in the market is proposed, an impact analysis 
should be made for the benefits and costs of it 
for the general public. So, the question comes – 
how are the parameters of this formula derived? 
Why exactly 10% for seniority bonuses, for 
example? This case is impossible to justify, 
because there is no sense in trying to determine 
wage rates on a national level. Modern forms of 
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work payments in developed countries depend 
on many criteria such as efficiency, education, 
experience, and skills, and include various types 
of compensation, such as employee options and 
shares of the corporation, result-orientated 
payment, retirement and healthcare benefits, etc. 
But unlike the government, company managers 
are able to evaluate the effects of such strategies 
depending on the characteristics of their business 
and the aims they pursue. In short, what is really 
fair is for everybody to be able to receive what 
he or she earns and to have the opportunity to 
climb up the hierarchy ladder based not only on 
years of experience and formal position 
characteristics, but also on qualifications and 
results. 
There is no magic formula in the sphere of labor 
policy and Minister Maslarova should not even 
try to invent it just in order to receive the 
approval of a part of the voters. On the contrary, 
it is necessary to defend and promote publicly 
the idea that the salaries should be liberalized, 
should be relieved from all relics of planning, 
and should be left to the free market and to the 
negotiation mechanisms between employers and 
employees. The ruling bodies can assist this 
process by optimizing the expenditures of the 
government administration, but not by 
undertaking activities such as inventing 
formulae where market processes rule and 
decrease the ineffective government costs and 
taxes. This optimization is the fastest, most 
efficient and established way to increase the 
revenues of the population. The same stands for 
labor unions – they should try to help, not hinder 
the life of the people whom they claim to 
represent. 
Control over wage rates is to some extent 
necessary for government-owned enterprises, 
but this is only one sign of the problems that 
exist in the management and functioning of 
state-owned companies. They are characterized 
by soft budget constraints, inefficient production 
and management, and financial instability. The 
problems will be solved only when companies 
are privatized and enter the competitive 
environment of private business. 
Even if the proposed ordinance is accepted, the 
formula will not dominate in the private sector 
and entrepreneurs will find ways to evade it, 
because market powers are stronger than the 
attempts at artificial restrictions, which are 
rather irrational and inefficient. But the public 
debate on such issues implies ideas that are 
adverse for the establishment of market 
processes. Confidence in the free market and in 
the private sector is vital for the creation of 
entrepreneurial attitudes and business culture in 
the economy. One should know that faith in 
one’s own abilities and qualities, not in the state, 
is the driver of the innovative spirit and 
economic prosperity. 
 
 
 
 
Impact of the World Cup on the Bulgarian 
Economy 
Veliko Dimitrov 
 
It is generally impossible to make an absolutely 
exact statement about the cumulative economic 
impacts that an event like the World Cup (WC) 
would have on a certain country’s economy. It is 
much more likely to guess which team out of 32 
and by what score would win the final game or 
who would happen to be the best scorer; all this 
at least because the number of possible 
outcomes are far fewer than those in regard to 
the various impacts that the WC could have on 
the economy. Nevertheless, applying the 
instruments and logic of economics could reveal 
in what direction and to what extent that event is 
influential over the economy. 
In general, the impact consists of the opposite 
dynamic of two macroeconomic indicators: 
consumption and labor productivity. 
 
Increase in consumer spending 
Events of that scale logically generate positive 
impulses to consumers: first, through enhanced 
advertising, which leads to higher awareness and 
propensity to consume, and second, through the 
inherent higher consumption of certain goods for 
the time a game is being followed. Of course we 
should add the increase in consumption of 
durable goods like flat screen TVs, as well as for 
symbol articles closely related to the event. All 
of this accounts for GDP and income growth and 
finally boosts the economy. Although this 
should be considered entirely positive, the 
increased consumption only takes place just in 
the short run. In the post-WC period, we may 
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witness a decrease in spending that could be 
intense enough even to balance out or exceed the 
previous rise. On the other hand, the time-
restricted upward tendency is mainly due to 
higher spending for non-investment goods (beer, 
wine, food), which, on its own, is unable to 
secure higher production and wealth in future. 
 
Decrease in worker’s productivity 
A downward tendency in labor’s productivity or 
just absenteeism is the other main effect 
resulting from the WC and people’s affection for 
it. According to a study of the Centre for 
Economics and Business Research4 during the 
2002 World Cup held in Japan and Korea, the 
EU15 suffered a 8,7 bn euro loss of GDP 
through absenteeism. Harder to estimate are 
losses resulting from lower productivity, 
especially for those professions where payment 
is not directly connected to output. In Bulgaria, 
like everywhere else, those employers who 
generally pay with no or little regard to 
measurable results are suffering much more. 
However, incurred losses would have been more 
significant if all or most of the games were 
broadcasted during the work day, very early or 
at night (which by the way is the case in Latin 
America, Australia or Asia). 
Ranked on third place, we might also have to 
mention the negative impact of the WC on the 
foreign exchange inflow into Bulgaria in terms 
of fewer visitors, which would mean 
comparatively higher trade balance deficit. 
There is for sure a certain number foreigners 
who if there were no WC, would have spent 
their holiday rather in Bulgaria, than in 
Germany. It is expected that over 1 million 
tourist would visit the host country and spend 
there over 700 million euro. On the other hand, 
the spending of all Bulgarians who had joined 
the WC live in Germany is equal to import of 
goods and services, which finally will push up 
the current account deficit.  
If we would like to be more specific and 
convincing about which WC impact 
predominates – the positive or the negative – let 
us take a look at what it is in economies, which 
are supposed to experience the most intensive 
impact, i.e. the hosts. 
 
                                                 
4 http://www.cebr.com/ 
Table 1: Cumulative growth in real gross 
domestic product host countries (1954 - 2002)  
Year Host country 
Pre: -
2 
years 
to WC 
World 
Cup 
Post: 
WC 
to +2 
1954 Switzerland 4,4 % 5,5 % 6,4 % 
1958 Sweden 2,6% 2,9 % 4,2 % 
1962 Chile 4,8 % 4,7 % 4,3 % 
1966 England 2,1 % 2,0 % 3,3 % 
1970 Mexico  6,6 % 6,9 % 6,3 % 
1974 Germany 2,5 % 0,3 % 1,8 % 
1978 Argentina  1,5 % - 3,2 % 4,2 % 
1982 Spain 0,6 % 1,2 % 1,8 % 
1986 Mexico - 0,5 
% 
- 3,1 % 1,5 % 
1990 Italy 2,4 % 2,0 % 2,5 % 
1994 USA 3,3 % 4,0 % 3,1 % 
1998 France 2,2 % 1,9 % 3,1 % 
2002 Korea / Japan 2,8 % 3,6 % 3,2 % 
Mean  2,7 % 2,2 % 3,5 % 
Source: John Irons, Center for American Progress  
 
As shown in the table (average score), a higher 
GDP growth rate is registered before and after 
the WC itself. In the short period before the WC 
takes place, this is to be interpreted with 
intensive construction or modernization of 
stadiums, hotels and transport infrastructure; in 
the post period, induced effects prevail. For 
instance, in Germany over 6,2 bn. euro has been 
invested in relation to the upcoming event. 
On average, despite the huge tourist flow and the 
surge in consumer spending, the WC year 
registers the lowest GDP growth rate. This is of 
course to a not inconsiderable degree, due to the 
lower worker’s productivity. Thus, we have to 
conclude that for host countries the decreased 
output as a result of lower labor productivity (or 
mere unwillingness to work) goes beyond the 
generally positive impact called forth by the 
increased domestic spending. 
In this connection, we have to conclude the 
following for the Bulgarian economy: there is 
certainly a downward tendency in labor 
productivity and an increase in consumer 
spending as well. All other positive impacts, 
which are intrinsic for all host countries, 
however, are not on the table for Bulgaria. After 
it has been clarified that the negative impact of 
decreased labor productivity in host countries is 
more significant that the cumulative effect of all 
other factors, we can with a very high grade of 
confidence hold the point that the net effect of 
the WC for the Bulgarian economy is negative.
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Money on the Bulgarian Property Market 
(2000 – 2005) 
Svetla Kostadinova 
 
Information about the money invested in the 
Bulgarian property market is very difficult to 
consolidate and assess. Nevertheless, we think 
that it is worth trying to estimate the flows in the 
market since it concentrates huge interest and 
funds.  
 
Money on the market 
The Institute for Market Economics tried to 
make estimations for the period 2000 – 2005 of 
total investments in real estate in the country. 
 
Local investments in real estate 
According to data from the central bank and 
IME assumptions, the total funds invested in 
property and financed by bank credits and 
savings are more than 8 billion euro for 2000 – 
2005.  
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Banks’ loans share in real estate transactions 2% 2% 5% 10% 15% 40% 
Housing mortgage loans volume (mln. BGN) 42 73 78 193 600 1 020 
Total funds invested in property (mln. BGN) 2 100 3 650 1 560 1 930 4 000 2 550 
Total funds invested in property financed by both 
bank loans and savings 2000 – 2005 (mln. BGN) 15 790 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Bulgarian National Bank, IME surveys of housing credit (2004) 
and IME survey on property market (2005, 2006). Exchange rate 1 Euro=1.95583 BGN 
 
 
Net foreign investments in real estate 
It is very hard to estimate the FDI in real estate 
since not all of it is registered (the data available 
is from notaries that should declare every deal 
with a foreigner involved; however, part of the 
declarations understate the transaction price). 
Therefore, we assume that reported data is 
underestimated by 30% and, bearing this in 
mind, we figure that the FDI in real estate in 
Bulgaria for 2000 – 2005 is approximately 437 
million euro. We should note that about 70% of 
this investment has been made in the last two 
years that mark the incredibly high growth of the 
real estate market. 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on BNB data; Exchange rate 1 Euro=1.95583 BGN 
 
Institute for Market Economics, Bulgaria 
Economic Policy Review, issue 40, June 2006 
10
Real estate investment funds 
It is worth trying to estimate the value of 
investment made by REITs in Bulgaria.  
First, we tried to estimate the amount of capital 
raised abroad for investment in property in 
Bulgaria. The information is very dispersed and 
hard to compile. We have looked at the 
Alternative Investment Market in London to 
reach some assessment since a large proportion 
of foreign investment in the country comes from 
UK. The data shows that more than 870 million 
euro has been raised for investment in property 
in Bulgaria. We cannot assess what proportion 
has already been invested, but the figure tells a 
lot.  
On the other hand, since the adoption of the 
Special Purpose Investment Companies Law in 
2003, twenty such companies have been 
registered. The total amount of registered capital 
is more than 60 million euro, and several 
companies have already been raising their 
capital for some time. The profile of their 
investments consists of commercial properties, 
vacation apartments and agricultural land. 
In conclusion, the overall amount of funds 
invested in property in Bulgaria for the last 5 
years is supposed to be of more than 9.4 billion 
euro.  
 
Brief review of the mortgage market in 
Bulgaria 
 
Primary mortgage market 
Mortgage lending was effectively resumed in 
2000 and has grown at an accelerating pace ever 
since. Funding of mortgage loans is based 
largely on deposits. Although mortgage bonds 
are being issued, they are not used as a primary 
funding source by banks, although this is 
changing and mortgage bond issuances are 
competing more and more with funding from 
deposits. 
Banks provide mortgage loans for new housing, 
existing housing, rehabilitation, and for business 
proposes. Mortgage loans are primarily 
denominated in the local currency and Euros. 
Terms, which were previously 5 to 10 years, 
have recently been extended to up to 25 years.  
The loans have variable rates, with rates updated 
at the bank’s convenience. LTVs generally range 
from 60 to 80 percent although effective LTVs 
may be lower. 
Mortgage interest rates for loans in local 
currency have fallen from 16 percent in 2001 to 
9 percent by May 2006.  (As a point of 
comparison, ten-year Government bonds yielded 
about 3.3 percent in 2005 and 6.7 percent in 
2001). 
Overall, mortgage loans are performing fairly 
well and overdue loans represent 7.4 percent 
(0.3% in 2002). The increase in non-performing 
loans is basically a result of the credit expansion 
in past 3 years. 
Due to competition, banks are becoming less 
conservative in underwriting mortgage loans. 
Third-party guarantees were once typically 
required, but in recent years the use of this 
security has declined. 
 
Secondary mortgage market 
Better market conditions and growing 
competition in the primary mortgage market 
have led to improved terms for borrowers and a 
renaissance in mortgage lending. Funding of 
mortgages is still achieved largely through 
deposits. The Mortgage Bonds Act (2000) 
helped banks finance their operations. It was the 
first in the region and is very flexible since it 
does not require special mortgage banks. The 
first issue was in 2003 and until the end of 2005, 
there were more than 20 issues with more than 
167 million euro raised, of which 22 million 
have already been redeemed. The interest rate is 
falling, reaching 5.25% on average at the 
moment in comparison to 7.75% in 2001. The 
average maturity is 3 to 5 years. 
The Special Purpose Investment Companies 
Law (2003) allows for securitization of tangible 
fixed assets and receivables, including future 
receivables, which are transferable assets. The 
companies do not pay profit tax and therefore 
are very attractive to both large and small 
investors. 
The reform of the Central bank credit register 
in 2004 that required all banks to report new or 
renegotiated loans has increased market 
transparency and allowed for subprime 
borrowers to have better access to bank credit.  
 
Players in the mortgage market 
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There are no specialized mortgage banks in 
Bulgaria. All commercial banks have mortgage 
credits in their portfolios but ten of them control 
75% of the market. The credit expansion since 
2003 has led to several major developments: (1) 
a reduction of interest rate spread; (2) an 
increase in credits’ volume, but with a more 
moderate pace in 2006, and (3) the entry of new 
non-financial intermediaries that facilitate the 
process such as credit intermediaries, mortgage 
brokers, etc. 
 
 
